A year of recession and recovery by William McChesney Martin
A Year of Recession and Recovery
WHEN I TESTIFIED before your Com-
mittee last year, on behalf of the Federal
Reserve Board, economic activity in this
country was receding. Contraction in out-
put and employment was general. Unem-
ployment was rising at a disturbing pace.
No one could be sure how far downward
adjustment would go, or how long it would
last.
We pointed out then that, with the ex-
ception of the catastrophic recession of the
thirties, every moderate cyclical decline
since World War I had been checked in
the course of a year. It was further em-
phasized that many forces were present in
the economy that were favorable to eventual
recovery. But at that time we did not know,
nor did we then expect, that vigorous re-
covery would so soon be in full swing, and
that contraction from 1957 levels of activity
would be shorter in duration than most pre-
ceding economic recessions.
Even while the Committee's Hearings
were going on, some were beginning to view
the outlook more optimistically. In Janu-
ary, corporations, taking advantage of
easier conditions and lower interest costs in
financial markets, were offering an increas-
ing volume of new issues in anticipation of
future needs for funds, and to refund
shorter term debt. State and local govern-
ments were bringing to market bond issues
that were deferred earlier, and were stepping
up the pace of bond offerings to provide
for public works.
NOTE.—Statement of William McChesney Martin,
Jr., Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, before the Joint Economic Com-
mittee, Feb. 6, 1959.
Farmers continued to foresee favorable
output and price conditions in agriculture
and were bidding up further the prices of
farm land. Bankers, with slackened cus-
tomer demand for credit and with strength-
ened reserve positions, were bidding more
aggressively for assets. By February,
bankers were accelerating expansion of the
assets and deposits of their institutions, thus
increasing more rapidly the economy's stock
of cash balances and raising its over-all
liquidity.
Within a matter of weeks following last
year's hearings, personal income and con-
sumer spending had ceased to decline and,
in fact, showed modest recovery. Produc-
tion and employment soon after resumed
an upward trend. Whether these develop-
ments, though encouraging, foreshadowed
wide revival in activity was not known at the
time; not until the June-July period did the
current flow of information and reports pro-
vide substantial confirmation that general
economic recovery was actually under way.
From that stage on, currently available
data, reflecting trends in markets, produc-
tion, and employment, showed that recovery
was both broadly based and vigorous.
Pickup in employment, however, lagged be-
hind that of output as is usual in early
phases of cyclical upswing. At the year-
end, eight months after recovery set in, the
level of total output in the economy approxi-
mated that prevailing at the output peak of
1957.
Recovery has been so rapid and wide-
spread as to indicate that the revival phase
of the economic cycle has by this time
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probably run its course. The economy has
reattained its prerecession level and now
appears to be entering a phase of resumed
economic growth.
FEDERAL RESERVE ACTION TO COMBAT
RECESSION
This brief review of changing levels of
economic activity during 1958 provides a
backdrop for specific comments about
Federal Reserve policy and action over the
past 16-month period of recession and
recovery.
As reported to you last year, Federal
Reserve policy began to shift in a counter-
recession direction in late October and early
November of 1957. About that time, the
System directed its open market operations
to supplying reserves more liberally to the
banking system. It also reduced the dis-
count rates on member bank borrowings
from the Reserve Banks. As the stream of
factual information verified the emergence
of recessionary trends, Federal Reserve
actions and policies became more aggressive
and discount rate, open market, and reserve
requirement instruments were actively ap-
plied in complementary fashion to foster
ease in credit markets and encourage bank
credit and monetary expansion.
From late fall 1957 through April 1958,
there were four reductions in Federal Re-
serve Bank discount rates, from 3Vi per
cent to 1
3A per cent. Through continuing
open market operations from late fall of
1957 to early last summer, the Reserve Sys-
tem supplied the commercial banks with
some $2 billion of reserve funds. Through
three successive reserve requirement reduc-
tions in late winter and early spring of last
year, the System released for the use of mem-
ber banks about $1.5 billion of their required
reserves.
The total amount of reserve funds sup-
plied by the System to commercial banks
over the nine months, November 1957-
July 1958, was enough to enable member
banks to reduce their discounts at the Re-
serve Banks from $800 million to about
$100 million, to offset sales of gold to
foreign countries amounting to about $1.5
billion, and to finance a commercial bank
credit expansion of almost $8 billion.
Monetary expansion from February through
July stimulated by this Federal Reserve
action was at an exceptionally rapid rate—
at an annual rate of 13 per cent for all
deposits, including time and demand de-
posits. For the active money supply, that
is, demand deposits and currency seasonally
adjusted, the rise was at an annual rate of
8 per cent. After the shift in Federal Re-
serve policy in the summer, expansion in
the active money supply slackened, and for
the year as a whole it amounted to about
3Vi per cent.
BROADER EFFECTS OF MONETARY ACTION
Although the immediate impact of Federal
Reserve policy was on commercial banks,
it clearly had broader effects upon the
economy generally. For one thing, since
commercial banks are direct participants
in some degree in all important credit
markets, expansion in bank lending and in-
vesting activities intensified competition
among all lenders for the acquisition of the
available supply of creditworthy loans and
securities. This worked to reduce the cost
of financing to borrowers generally—busi-
nesses, farmers, consumers and home buyers,
and all levels of government. It also
widened access of all potential borrowers
to credit funds.
Another effect of the credit ease was a
greater willingness on the part of banks and
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other lenders to make new loans to business
customers and to renew outstanding credits.
This facilitated the orderly run-off of excess
business inventories accumulated in the pre-
ceding boom. It also furthered the com-
pletion of business programs of plant and
equipment expansion begun in that period.
With a $6 billion reduction in business in-
ventory holdings and a significant cutback
in fixed investment programs since recession
began, it is perhaps remarkable that busi-
ness loans outstanding declined only $1.5
billion in the year ending September 1958.
The ability of businesses to maintain their
bank borrowing and also to borrow more
readily in capital markets not only cushioned
downward pressures on investment spend-
ing but helped many companies to minimize
cutbacks in their working force and pay-
rolls, to maintain dividends, and to
strengthen liquidity positions.
In housing markets, the easier conditions
broadened the availability of mortgage
funds. Discounts were reduced on FHA
and VA mortgages subject to ceiling interest
rates, and interest rates on new conventional
mortgages also fell. As bank credit expan-
sion gained in momentum, banks partici-
pated in mortgage investment more actively
than at any time since the boom housing
year of 1955. The increased availability
of mortgage funds at lower cost, together
with the maintenance of personal income,
was promptly reflected in a step-up of
builder activity in constructing new houses.
In the consumer instalment credit area,
the increased availability of funds made it
possible for lenders to meet sound demands
for credit more readily, thus bolstering
lagging demands for consumer durable
goods. On some transactions, terms were
eased and, in addition, new credit plans
were developed and extended. Easier credit
conditions permitted lenders to be more
liberal in granting renewals and extensions
of time for repayment of outstanding credit.
Thus, the volume of repossessions and
credit losses was less than would otherwise
have been the case, with benefits to both
borrowers and lenders.
Increased availability of funds also had
an important impact on State and local
government financing and spending. In
many cases, the lower cost of financing en-
couraged States and municipalities to bor-
row in order to finance capital projects. In
a few cases, lower market rates enabled
local governments that had a legal ceiling
on permissible interest rates to return to the
market. The increase in spending by State
and local governments from the summer of
1957 to the summer of 1958 was a billion
dollars more than in the corresponding
period of the preceding year.
These observable effects of easier mone-
tary conditions which developed from efforts
to combat recession were, of course, im-
portant and salutary. They are not to be
overly stressed, however, for monetary
action is always only one element in Gov-
ernment counter-recession policy. In turn,
Government policy is always only one ele-
ment in the total economic scene. Busi-
nesses, individuals, and State and local
governments, in the light of their own
circumstances, were taking actions to ad-
just and adapt their situations and to re-
direct their energies. Their actions un-
doubtedly shaped the recovery and gave
it momentum.
CHANGING EXPECTATIONS
Achievement of monetary ease to combat
recession so promptly and amply was not
without its problems. One of the most
acute was the build-up of prices in the bond
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market as speculators counted on continu-
ing business recession, credit ease, and still
higher bond prices. Psychological reactions
and expectations always play a role in
swings in economic and financial develop-
ments, but were of particular importance in
financial markets last summer as the eco-
nomic outlook changed from one of a con-
tinuing recession to one of early, vigorous
recovery.
At that time, the improved economic out-
look led to a sharp change in expectations
in regard to renewed inflationary pressures
and a turnabout in the trend of interest
rates. A much larger Federal deficit loomed
up than had been estimated, as well as the
crisis and threat of military action in the
Middle East. Concern about the drain of
gold from the nation's monetary reserves
through sales of gold to the industrial
nations of Europe was a further cause of
uncertainty. The fact that the Canadian
Government announced a major refunding
operation at sharply higher interest rates
was also a complicating factor.
In these circumstances, heavy market
sales by holders of United States Govern-
ment securities in anticipation of higher
interest rates sharply depressed bond prices.
Initially, this selling stemmed from tem-
porary holders who had bought in anticipa-
tion of a continued rise in Government
security prices. Some of these holdings had
been acquired with funds borrowed on thin
margins in connection with the Treasury's
June financing operations. In many cases,
selling was forced because the margins
vanished as security prices declined.
Prices of Government securities continued
to decline under pressure of steady liquida-
tion and the reluctance of investors to pur-
chase market offerings in view of changed
prospects for credit demands and inflation-
ary threats. On July 18, the Federal Open
Market Committee concluded that the
market situation had become disorderly and
decided to intervene temporarily in the
medium- and long-term sectors of the Gov-
ernment securities market. This action was
within the framework of the Committee's
established operating rules. From July 18
to July 23 the System purchased $1.2 billion
of securities involved in a Treasury refinanc-
ing and a small amount of other notes and
bonds.
Thereafter, as market conditions became
more orderly, no further Federal Reserve
open market transactions were effected out-
side the usual area of short-term Govern-
ment securities. During late July and early
August, sales of Treasury bills by the System
together with other factors that absorb re-
serves more than offset the large volume of
reserves supplied to the market by Federal
Reserve intervention in the Government
bond market.
SHIFT IN FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY
By this time, there was clear evidence in
current statistics that recovery in economic
activity and production, though not yet in
employment, had gained considerable mo-
mentum and was likely to go forward with-
out serious setback. Moreover, in view of
the strength of consumer demand, further
decline in business inventory holdings and
capital outlays was no longer likely. Mone-
tary policy was now reinforcing the existing
foundation of productive activity and pre-
paring the economy for a new advance.
About this time, inflationary expectations
began to spread. The abrupt upward shift
of interest levels in central money markets,
while precipitated by liquidation of specu-
lative positions in Government securities,
reflected investor demand for an interest
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premium to cover the risk of a depreciating
purchasing power of invested funds. It was
accompanied by a significant shift in in-
vestor allocation of newly available funds
to common stocks instead of fixed interest
obligations, with hedging against inflation
a frequent explanation of the change in in-
vestor policy. Large current and prospec-
tive demands for credit by the Federal Gov-
ernment, State and local governments, and
home purchasers, also influenced the rising
cost of borrowed funds. In the stock market,
the volume of trading was expanding rapidly
and the rise in stock prices carried the yields
on common stocks below the yields on bonds
of the same companies.
Developments in our financial markets,
as well as the very large deficit which the
Federal Government was facing, were
occasioning concern, abroad as well as at
home, about the future of the dollar. The
extent of concern among foreign financial
leaders was clearly evident last fall at the
annual meeting of the International Bank
and Monetary Fund at New Delhi, India.
In the light of the rapidly changing
economic situation, in many ways highly
encouraging but with inflationary and specu-
lative psychology spreading, the Federal
Reserve, during the summer, began to
moderate the policy of credit ease with a
view to tempering the rate of bank credit
and monetary expansion.
System open market operations after
midsummer supplied only a portion of the
reserves needed to meet rising credit de-
mands and to offset the reserve drain of a
continued gold outflow. As a result, mem-
ber banks were obliged to draw down their
excess reserves and to increase their borrow-
ings from the Federal Reserve Banks. Such
borrowing was made more costly when Re-
serve Bank discount rates were raised in the
late summer from 1% per cent to 2 per
cent, and at mid-fall when they were again
raised to a level of 2Vi per cent.
Since last summer, bank credit and the
money supply have continued to expand but
at a rate much reduced from earlier in the
year. Some seasonal expansion in business
loans was supplemented by a rapid growth
of real estate loans. On the other hand,
bank holdings of short-term United States
Government securities rose only moderately
despite a substantial increase in their supply
to finance the Treasury's deficit. With
business sales and liquidity showing rapid
rise, the higher interest rates that developed
in the market helped to attract a substan-
tial volume of funds of nonbank investors,
especially business corporations, into the
purchase of the new short-term Treasury
issues. As a consequence, the Treasury was
able to finance most of its deficit outside
the banking system, and at the same time
banks were able to meet private credit de-
mands accompanying economic recovery,
with only a moderate further growth in total
bank credit and money.
REGULATION OF MARGIN REQUIREMENTS
In addition to its broader monetary re-
sponsibilities, the Federal Reserve is directed
by law to prescribe margin requirements to
guard against excessive use of credit for
purchasing or carrying stock market secu-
rities. By providing a means of dealing
directly with this volatile type of credit,
margin requirements serve as a special-
purpose supplement to the general instru-
ments of Federal Reserve action. Since the
flow of credit into the stock market fluctu-
ates with general business conditions,
changes in margin requirements are usually
correlated with policy actions that affect
general credit availability.
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Following the stock market decline in the
early fall of 1957, total credit to customers
for purchasing and carrying stock market
securities declined by about 5 per cent and
was back to about the level outstanding in
mid-1955. With this indication of abatement
of credit use in the stock market, the Board
of Governors, early in January 1958, re-
duced the required margin from 70 to 50
per cent.
With the increasing activity and rise in
stock prices accompanying economic re-
covery, stock market credit rose sharply,
reaching by July a level about 20 per cent
above the volume at the beginning of the
year. In view of the rapid rise in credit to
finance trading in or temporary ownership
of stocks and the emerging investment
psychology favoring purchase of stocks as
an inflation hedge, the Board, early last
August, restored the required margin to 70
per cent. As outstanding stock market
credit continued to rise following this action,
the Board, in mid-October, raised the re-
quired margin to 90 per cent.
THE CURRENT SITUATION
The shift in monetary policy during the fall
aligned monetary expansion more closely
with the developing potential of the econ-
omy. Consumer spending on durable goods
and housing continued to expand and was
reflected in high levels of output of house-
hold durables, in a pick-up in production of
1959 autos, and in a rise in new housing
starts to one of the highest levels in recent
years. Business inventory policies were
switching from liquidation towards accumu-
lation, and there was a widespread, though
small, upturn in capital expenditures. At
the same time, Federal, as well as State and
local government spending, was expanding
rapidly in accordance with budgetary
authorizations adopted earlier.
In financial markets moderate curtail-
ment of credit availability and higher in-
terest rates served to dampen speculative
excesses then developing, to restrain and
spread out the volume of new corporate and
municipal security financing, and to facili-
tate the financing of the large Federal deficit
outside the banking system. The restraint
of corporate and municipal security financ-
ing followed some anticipatory borrowing
by these issuers earlier in the year when long-
term interest rates were lower. At the turn
of the year, business capital financing was
again rising, and there was a large calendar
of authorized but unissued State and local
government securities.
Total economic activity, measured in real
terms, has regained its earlier peak. The
active money supply has increased by about
2
lA per cent above the prerecession level,
and holdings of other liquid assets, including
time deposits, are up sharply. The financial
basis for further growth is established.
While economic prospects are generally
favorable, there are several areas—unem-
ployment, exports, prices, and Federal
finance—that are matters for continuing
concern.
Despite the rapid recovery in production
and sales, unemployment remains disquiet-
ingly high. The lag in employment is in
part the result of a marked increase in
productivity. The present availability of
capital and manpower resources represents
a potential for near-term growth of the
economy without inflation. As output of
goods and services expands in response to
growing demands, opportunities for employ-
ment should increase as they have in past
periods of economic expansion.
In exports, which declined sharply until
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early last year, recovery has not yet set in.
The export decline was largely in materials
and fuels and was due in part to the ending
of boom conditions abroad; resumption of
economic expansion is now beginning in
industrial countries abroad and eventually
there should be some improvement in
foreign demand for our exports. It is sig-
nificant, however, that the European coun-
tries which announced a broader converti-
bility for their currencies at the end of 1958
—and other countries too—are giving our
exports of manufactures stiff competition
in price and quality, and these countries are
now able to devote a larger share of their
resources to their own exports than they
could in earlier postwar years. While this
reflects progress towards international bal-
ance, our producers need to adjust to these
competitive forces abroad if they are to
share in growing world markets.
Prospects for our international payments
position thus merge with the third problem;
that is, our price system. A market economy
such as ours depends upon the price mech-
anism to allocate resources by reflecting the
interplay of demand and supply. The price
mechanism cannot do its job of efficient
resource allocation in accordance with the
changing demands of consumers unless
there is some flexibility in individual prices.
This does not mean that wide swings in the
general price level are desirable. The price
paid by Smith represents the income of
Jones. But there is cause for concern when,
in spite of a decline in the demand for his
product, Jones raises his price, and an op-
portunity to stimulate both output and em-
ployment is thwarted. This is particularly
disturbing when it comes on top of a price
rise that Jones made when the demand for
his product increased. Such a one-way
movement of prices—whether it is explained
as demand-pull, cost-push, or both—is not
compatible with an efficient market system.
If it were to be continued, it would pose
a serious threat to the otherwise favorable
prospects for healthy growth in consumption
and production.
Now as to Federal finances, it is essential
at this stage of the economic cycle that the
Government should attain a balanced budget
and then achieve some surplus as economic
advance continues. Whatever the desirable
level of expenditures, deficits, while justified
in time of recession, should be avoided when
the economy is at a high level of activity.
It is also of vital importance to have a
healthy, broad-based Government securities
market that enables the Treasury to lodge
its debt outside the banking system. In
other words, the Treasury must be able to
compete effectively and flexibly with other
borrowers for the available supply of
savings.
Appropriate debt management policies,
while contributing to financial stability, are
in turn dependent on such stability. In-
vestors cannot be induced to purchase fixed
income securities if they fear a steady
erosion of the purchasing power of the
dollar.
The banking system has an important role
to play in aiding the Treasury's financing.
This role involves assistance in the broad
distribution of securities and, in accordance
with the volume of reserves made available
and the meeting of essential private credit
demands, the retention by banks of that
portion of the Government debt that is con-
sistent with stability of the dollar. Resort
to financing Government deficits through
the banking system entails the creation of
new supplies of money rather than the use
of existing funds. In a period of high eco-
nomic activity, this is a high road to mone-
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tary inflation. There can be no effective
control of inflation if the banking system
is made the major source of funds to finance
government deficits.
GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH
As the United States economy emerges from
the recession of 1957-58, it seems likely, if
past experience is a guide, that we are on
the threshold of a new period of economic
growth. This is an opportune occasion,
therefore, to consider the question of appro-
priate public and private policies to foster
steady expansion of the economy.
Economic growth is a principal objective
of governmental policy in every country of
the world. The rate of growth is widely
accepted as an indicator of the performance
of an economy. A word of caution is in
order, however, regarding the very difficult
task of measuring growth. Growth measure-
ments, particularly when they cover long
periods of time and comparisons of one
country with another, are necessarily ap-
proximations. They vary with a host of
factors, including the scope of activities
covered, both public and private; the char-
acter of such activities; quality as contrasted
to quantity of output; and many others.
Nevertheless, regardless of these measure-
ment difficulties, growth estimates, properly
constructed and interpreted, can be useful
aids in appraising economic performance.
Desirable economic growth goes beyond
increases in line with a growing population
and labor force. It involves a rate that
makes possible rising living standards
through increasing consumption per capita
for present and future generations. This re-
quires increasing output per worker; that
is, higher productivity through advancing
technology.
In our economy, consumption takes the
form mainly of consumer purchases of the
goods and services supplied in free markets
by private producers and merchants. Our
living standards also encompass services
provided by the various levels of govern-
ment. Fundamentally, economic growth at
a more rapid rate than population increase
is the response of men to their ever increas-
ing wants.
Among the other reasons for seeking eco-
nomic growth is the importance of dem-
onstrating to the world that free economies
under democratic political systems can out-
perform regimented economies under dicta-
torial political systems in providing high
and rising living standards for all of the
people.
Economic progress, however, cannot be
measured merely by percentage increases in
the quantity of output. Also at stake is the
opportunity to live as free men, the respon-
siveness of the productive system to the
desires and tastes of consumers, the quality
of goods and services, the degree of leisure
and opportunities for using it in a satisfying
way, and our willingness to aid other nations
seeking similar advantages. These aspects
of our economic performance will have a
great influence on how the rest of the world
judges the merits of free versus regimented
economies.
ECONOMIC GROWTH WITHOUT INFLATION
When we consider the influence of govern-
mental policies on economic growth, it is
useful to distinguish between two related
aspects of the process. First, growth in-
volves expanding capacity to produce goods
and services. Second, it involves expanding
demands for goods and services at a rate
sufficient to utilize the expanded capacity.
The first aspect of growth—an expanding
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output potential—depends upon such basic
factors as additions to the labor force, ad-
vancing technology, and a flow of savings
combined with a desire and ability on the
part of producers to use them in the creation
of a growing stock of modern plant and
equipment. The other aspect of growth de-
pends upon a balanced expansion in de-
mands for final product by the major sec-
tors of the economy—households, busi-
nesses, governments at the State and local
as well as the Federal level, and demands
from abroad.
For growth to be sustainable, an equilib-
rium between these two sides of growth
must be maintained. If total demands do
not keep up with the output potential, over-
all growth will slacken, for the inducement
to business to add to productive capacity
will lessen. If total demands tend to run
ahead of the output potential, the general
price level will begin to rise and this, in
turn, will have an adverse impact both on
growth of demands and on means of financ-
ing increased and improved capacity. It
will also have adverse effects on the effi-
ciency with which resources are utilized;
likewise, the equity or fairness with which
final products are distributed in markets
among consumers, businesses, and savers.
What then is the function of monetary
policy in relation to these two aspects of
growth? In general, it is to attempt to pro-
vide credit and monetary resources and an
atmosphere in financial markets conducive
to the basic growth factors. At the same
time, aggregate demand for goods and serv-
ices should expand in close relation to the
capacity to produce.
On the demand side, growth basically de-
pends on spending out of incomes earned
in the production of goods and supplying
of services. Monetary policy facilitates the
expansion of money holdings, through sound
credit expansion, consistent with the grow-
ing capacity of the economy to produce
without inflation.
On the supply side, basic growth factors
are the labor force, technology, and invest-
ment of savings. Growth of the labor force
is to some extent influenced by over-all de-
mands, but more generally by population
growth, age distribution, and social customs.
Technological progress and the desire to
save and invest savings productively are in-
fluenced by the monetary environment. An
atmosphere of price and financial stability
in general is necessary both to the incentive
to save and to rapid technological advance.
Thus, through continuous efforts to safe-
guard the value of the dollar and to create
a climate of financial stability in which
savers can have confidence in the future
value of their investments, monetary policy
makes a contribution to economic growth
quite apart from its influence on demands
for goods and services.
It is for these reasons that price and
financial stability is essential to the achieve-
ment of maximum economic growth. We
have had a fairly good growth record over
our history, but we have had too much in-
stability in our levels of employment and
prices. A major problem is to moderate
this instability so that the losses in employ-
ment and output of recession periods will
not depress our longer term rate of growth.
Currently there is widespread concern about
the danger of renewal of inflationary trends.
The Federal Reserve shares that concern.
To point to dangers in this situation is not
to forecast inflation. Public and private
actions appropriate to present circumstances
can prevent these dangers from materializing.
Among potential inflationary factors first,
perhaps foremost, is the budgetary position
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of the Federal Government. As the economy
moves up toward more intensive utilization
of its productive resources, it is essential
that deficits give way to surpluses. There
is no mystery about this source of danger.
If the will exists, the way will be found.
It clearly lies in adaptation of Federal ex-
penditure and tax policies in order to pro-
duce a budgetary surplus in prosperous
times.
Second, there are the problems arising
from the so-called cost-push inflation which
is part of a spiral process stimulated by de-
mand pressures. In the period ahead there
is a strong prospect that demands will con-
tinue to expand. In these circumstances, we
must recognize the dangers both of wage
increases in excess of productivity growth
and of price increases beyond what the traffic
will bear. Business and labor leaders have
a paramount responsibility to the general
public as they make wage and price de-
cisions over the coming year.
Then there is the easy acceptance of the
idea that a little inflation is not seriously
harmful. The experience in the Govern-
ment bond market, to which I alluded, is
a vivid example of the influence of inflation-
ary expectations in financial markets. To
the extent that such attitudes come to be
reflected in decisions on wages, prices, con-
sumption, and investment, they help to bring
about their own realization.
These are the major reasons for concern
about the possible development of inflation-
ary pressures. To be fully aware of a danger,
and to face up to it, is not to despair or to
capitulate, nor does it mean being blind to
other national needs, including sustained
economic growth.
The Federal Reserve System will continue
to the best of its ability to contribute, so
far as it can, to continuing prosperity and
economic growth, without inflation. Such
decisions as it must make within its particu-
lar province manifestly are not enough to
assure attainment of the national objectives
to which we all subscribe. What this Con-
gress decides, what management, labor,
agriculture and, indeed, the public generally
decide to do will win or lose the battle
against debasement of the currency with all
of its perils to free institutions.
The state of the nation tomorrow—its
progress and prosperity—rests with the
decisions of today.
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